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This paper seeks to analyse the issues emerging from the imposition of certain antitrust 
remedies, such as the obligation to grant intellectual property licenses regarding key inventions 
covered by patent or copyright and to stipulate contracts with other firms, including 
competitors, as a means to remedy the consequences of antitrust infringements.  It will consider 
the extent to which Article 7 remedies can be reconciled with other important tenets of the 
market economy, such as the freedom to contract and the right to peacefully enjoy one’s 
possessions. After briefly examining the rationale for the application of certain human rights’ 
guarantees to competition investigations and decisions, the first part of the paper will consider 
the questions of whether and to what extent the European Convention on Human Rights 
protects economic freedom and compare the current position with that adopted by the US 
Supreme Court.  The second part will illustrate the notion of competition remedies and 
consider whether the principles governing them are compatible with current human rights 
standards as well as with the concept of the rule of law as a tool to protect ‘everyone’ from the 
arbitrary or disproportionate use of public power. The final part of the paper will argue that 
although antitrust remedies pursue a legitimate objective, i.e. the preservation of economic well-
being through competitive markets, they must also comply with basic human rights safeguards, 
such as the protection of property and of freedom to contract, by striking a “fair balance” 
between the common good and the legitimate interests of the affected undertakings.  It will be 
concluded that the practice in this area should conform to standards consistent with the 
principles enshrined in the ECHR and to the substantive concept of ‘rule of law’, i.e. accuracy, 
administrability, consistency, objectivity, applicability and transparency. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Fostering genuine competition across the Common Market is at the forefront of the 
action of the European Commission. To achieve this goal, the 2003 Modernisation 
Regulation strengthened its powers of investigation and sanction and provided an 
express legal basis for imposing behavioural or structural obligations on undertakings 
found to have infringed the competition rules, in order to end the breach. However, the 
case law concerning Article 102 TFEU demonstrates that antitrust remedies can have a 
pervasive impact on the right of the concerned firms to enjoy their property and to 
choose freely their contractual partners. Consequently, a question emerges as to where 
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the boundary should be drawn between enhancing competition through administrative 
action and safeguarding business freedom.  
The first part of this paper will examine the approach adopted by EU competition law 
in respect to antitrust remedies and will analyse it in the light of the right to peacefully 
enjoy one’s property and freedom of contract, provided by the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECHR). Thereafter, the standards of 
protection of business freedom in the US Constitution will be scrutinised with 
particular regard for the question of whether antitrust enforcement can constitute a 
legitimate ground for restraining the ability of commercial actors to freely determine 
how to conduct their affairs on the market, especially by forcing them to share their 
inventions with rivals. 
The paper will then consider whether the requirements of ‘necessity’ and 
‘proportionality’ governing antitrust remedies in EU law are compatible with the human 
rights standards enshrined in Article 1, Protocol I to the ECHR. It will be argued that 
although antitrust remedies pursue a legitimate objective, i.e. the preservation of 
competition to encourage economic progress, they should be compatible with the 
protection of property and the freedom to stipulate contracts and with the rule of law 
and especially its requirement that a ‘fair balance’ be struck between the common good 
and the legitimate interests of the concerned parties.  
For this reason, the paper will suggest that the existing criteria governing antitrust 
remedies in refusal to deal cases should be inspired by a more restrained attitude as 
regards the extent to which the Commission can impose on dominant undertaking an 
obligation to ‘share’ the outcome of their investment with others. It will be argued that 
the pre-existing rules enshrined in the ECJ’s IMS Health judgment could constitute a 
useful blueprint to develop these new standards.  
2. ANTITRUST REMEDIES AS A MEANS TO ‘BRING THE INFRINGEMENT TO AN 
END’ IN EU COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT 
Council Regulation No 1/2003’s Article 7 empowers the Commission to ‘impose any 
behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement 
committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end’. However, 
antitrust remedies had already been imposed by the Commission under Council 
Regulation No 17/621 on the basis of its Article 3(1), according to which the 
Commission could ‘by decision require the undertakings or the associations of 
undertakings concerned to’ terminate their infringement.2 
Thus, the ECJ held in its Commercial Solvents judgment3 that this provision should be 
applied to each individual case having regard to the features of the breach established 
                                                                                                                                         
1  See e.g. WHISH, Competition Law, 5th Ed, 2005: OUP, pp 254-55. 
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  Arianna Andreangeli 
(2010) 6(2) CompLRev 
 
227
by the decision4 and should be read as allowing the Commission not only to oblige the 
parties to cease anti-competitive behaviour but also ‘to do certain acts and provide 
certain advantages which have been wrongfully withheld’ to restore competition on the 
relevant market.5 The Court rejected the applicants’ arguments that by ordering them to 
provide ‘specific supplies’ to a former customer6 had acted outside the remit of its 
powers and upheld the obligation imposed on Commercial Solvents to continue 
supplying an existing customer with a view to avoiding the latter being excluded from 
the relevant, downstream market.7 
The same principles were later applied in the Magill case, concerning instead the 
question of whether a refusal to grant an intellectual property licence on the part of a 
dominant undertaking infringed Article 102 TFEU. Both the General Court and the 
Court of Justice confirmed the decision finding an infringement of the prohibition 
contained in Article 102 TFEU and the legality of the remedy imposed on the 
applicants.8 Thus, the Commission could impose obligations ‘to take or to refrain from 
taking certain actions’ to bring the infringement to an end and if required:9 forcing the 
applicants to license the use of copyrighted information to third parties had accordingly 
been necessary and proportionate to restore antitrust compliance.10  
Today, Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003 not only provides a firm and express legal 
basis for the imposition of remedies, but also reiterates the applicability of the same 
criteria of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ in their design, whose observance appears 
directly related to the application of the substantive rules that are relevant to ascertain 
whether the EU competition rules have been infringed.  
A detailed examination of the case law and of the issues arising from the application of 
Article 102 TFEU to refusals to deal and to license intellectual property rights goes 
beyond the remit of this paper. It is however beyond doubt that that the principles 
governing the finding of an infringement of Article 102 in cases of refusals to deal have 
undergone significant change. If in its older case law the Court of Justice had taken the 
view that refusals to deal and especially to license intellectual property rights would 
infringe the EU competition rules only exceptionally,11 in later judgments it seemed to 
somehow ‘mellow down’ its approach.  
                                                                                                                                         
4  Id., para 45. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Id., para 44. 
7  Id., para 46. 
8  Case T-69/89, RTE v Commission, [1991] ECR II-485, especially paras 70-73; Case C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP 
v Commission, [1995] ECR I-743, especially paras 91, 93-94. 
9  Case T-69/89, RTE v Commission, [1991] ECR II-485, para 97. 
10  C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v Commission, [1995] ECR I-743, para 93. 
11  See e.g. case 238/87, Volvo v Veng, [1988] ECR 6211, para 8-9. For commentary, see Evans & Padilla, The 
Law and Economics of Article 82 EC Treaty, 2006, Oxford/Portland OR: Hart Publishing, pp 409-410, 424. 
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The Court held in the IMS Health preliminary ruling that a refusal to grant an 
intellectual property license would breach Article 102 TFEU only if the ‘input’ covered 
by the license was ‘indispensable’ to operate on a distinct market, in the sense of not 
being duplicable.12 The complainant would also have to establish that, after the access 
to the protected input, it would be able to offer a ‘new product’, i.e. output that is 
genuinely novel and not a duplicate of existing goods or services, and that the refusal 
was not objectively justified.13 This test was read as providing a framework to 
counterbalance the preservation of effective competition, especially in markets where 
innovation is a key factor for the rivalry between undertakings, and the concern for 
encouraging the drive to invest and furthering technical development.14  
Later decisions,15 together with the Guidance document published by the Commission 
in 2009 on the application of Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary abuses (hereinafter 
referred to as 2009 Guidance)16 seem to have distanced themselves from this ‘finely 
balanced’ approach.17 It is argued that perhaps influenced by its victory in the Microsoft 
case,18 the Commission adopted a more generous stance in respect to the conditions 
enumerated in the IMS Health test that had hitherto served the purpose of striking a 
balance between safeguarding the ‘process’ of competition and encouraging future 
investment by providing appropriate financial rewards.19  
According to the Commission’s 2009 Guidance,20 refusing to deal with a competitor 
and to license an input regarded as ‘indispensable’ to compete effectively on a given 
                                                                                                                                         
12  Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co, [2004] ECR I-5039, para 48; see also 
Case C-7/97, Bronner v Mediaprint, [1998] ECR I-7791, para 28. 
13  Case C-418/01, cit. (fn. 12), para 48-49; see also Opinion of AG Tizzano, para 62. 
14  Id., per AG Tizzano, para 62; see also para 48 of the judgment. For commentary, see, inter alia, Hatzopoulos, 
“Refusal to Deal: the EC essential facilities doctrine”, in Amato & Ehlermann (Eds), EC Competition Law: a 
critical assessment, 2006: Oxford, Portland OR, Hart Publishing, p 354.  
15  E.g. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601 (hereinafter referred to as Microsoft 2007 
judgment), see especially para 331, 434-435; see also Commission Decision of 24 May 2004, Microsoft, C(2004) 
900 (hereinafter referred to as Microsoft 2004 Decision), especially para 669, 684-685; see also, Commission 
Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, December 2005, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (hereinafter referred to as 
2005 Discussion Paper), para 235. For commentary, see inter alia Pardolesi & Renda, ‘The European 
Commission’s case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?’, (2004) 27(4) W Comp 513 at pp 537-541. 
16  Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C(2009) 864C (final), 9 February 2009, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance_en.pdf (hereinafter referred to as 2009 
Guidance). 
17  See e.g. Rousseva, ‘Abuse of dominant position defences: objective justification and Article 82 in the era of 
Modernisation’, in Amato & Ehlermann (Eds.), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment, 2006: Oxford, 
Portland OR, Hart Publishing, pp 394-395. 
18  Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601 (hereinafter referred to as 2007 Microsoft 
judgment). 
19 Case C-7/97, Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint, [1998] ECR I-7791, paras 41, 43-44. See 2009 Guidance, paras 81, 
86; also 2005 Discussion Paper, para 228. For commentary, see, inter alia, Kitch, ‘The nature and function of 
the patent system’, (1977) 20 J Law & Econ 265 at 278-279. 
20  See 2009 Guidance, paras 81, 86-89. 
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market would result in (or be likely to lead to) consumer harm not only if the refusal 
prevented rivals from supplying a ‘novel’ product, but also if it jeopardised their ability 
to engage in ‘follow-on’ innovation.21 However, it may legitimately be questioned 
whether the new approach is capable of continuing to fulfil the ‘balancing function’ 
played by the IMS test and especially to reconcile the interests of rivals in the short 
term with the objective of boosting long term investment by powerful firms.22 
It is concluded that the current approach raises a serious question as to whether the 
interpretation of Article 102 TFEU in refusals to license cases constitutes a 
proportionate response to the concurring needs to reconcile the integrity of intellectual 
property for the purpose of fostering technical development and to maintain effective 
competition.23 After addressing some general issues relating to their applicability to 
corporate actors, the next sections will consider whether the reading of Article 102 
TFEU adopted by the Commission and the EU Courts can be reconciled with the rules 
protecting property rights and freedom of contract provided by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
3. ANTITRUST REMEDIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS’ PROTECTION: BALANCING 
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION AGAINST THE ECHR ‘ECONOMIC RIGHTS’ 
3.1. Human rights, corporate actors and competition enforcement: introductory 
remarks 
The limited purvey of this paper does not allow a detailed examination of the question 
of whether the human rights’ guarantees enshrined in the ECHR are applicable to 
‘corporate actors’ as well as the issue of the relevance of the Convention rules for the 
overall ‘fairness’ of competition proceedings before the Commission or the NCAs, the 
latter when they enforce the Treaty antitrust rules. Suffice to say that, despite having 
been originally envisaged to protect individuals’ rights, the Convention provides in 
Article 1 for a duty on the Contracting Parties to secure the rights it contains to 
‘everyone’ within their jurisdiction, regardless of their status or legal nature.24  
Having regard specifically to business freedom, it was suggested that the Convention’s 
founding values and especially its commitment to personal liberty, favour the 
                                                                                                                                         
21 Id., para 87; cf. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co, [2004] ECR I-5039, para 
43. For commentary, inter alia, Andreangeli, ‘Interoperability as an essential facilities in the Microsoft case: 
encouraging competition or stifling innovation?’, (2009) 34(4) ELRev 584 at 608.  
22  2009 Guidance, para. 89. For commentary, see, inter alia, Larouche, ‘The European Microsoft case at the 
crossroads of competition policy and innovation’, TILEC Discussion Paper, May 2008, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1140165#, pp 12-13. 
23  E.g. Case C-7/97, Bronner v Mediaprint, [1998] ECR I-7791, paras 28, 41-44; for commentary, inter alia, 
Hatzopoulos, ‘Refusal to Deal: the EC essential facilities doctrine’, in Amato & Ehlermann (Eds), EC 
Competition Law: a critical assessment, 2006: Oxford, Portland OR, Hart Publishing, p 354 et seq.; also 
Andreangeli, ‘Interoperability as an essential facilities in the Microsoft case: encouraging competition or stifling 
innovation?’, (2009) 34(4) ELRev 584 at 608-610. 
24  See, e.g., Emberland, The human rights of companies, (2005) Oxford University Press, pp 33-34. 
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protection of a number of rights having an ‘economic substance’, such as the right to 
peacefully enjoy property and in that context, freedom of covenant.25  
Commentators argued that the protection of property rights is fully consistent with the 
essence of the rule of law: by confining the exercise of discretionary powers only to 
cases in which governmental intervention is strictly necessary to promote the ‘most 
productive’ use of resources, this principle protects the incentive to invest in new 
technical advancements,26 ensures that any adverse effects of these forms of public 
intervention on individual rights are offset by imposing certain procedural requirements 
and therefore establishes a duty to grant compensation to those affected by it,27 
consistently with principles of ‘fairness’, foreseeability and proportionality.28 
It is suggested that the ECHR is consistent with these principles, being inspired by 
political democracy and personal freedom, the latter intended as the ‘absence of 
(arbitrary) public encroachment of the private sphere’,29 and providing safeguards such 
as the right to a fair trial and the protection of individual rights against arbitrary or 
disproportionate interferences on the part of State authorities, as provided by, inter alia, 
Articles 8(2) and 10(2) of the Convention.30 The emphasis placed on the requirements 
of clarity and foreseeability of the law governing these interferences conforms to the 
conditions of legal certainty enshrined in the rule of law.31 
In this context, freedom of enterprise is consistent with the protection of individual 
freedom and of the right to peacefully enjoy property.32 However, it is clear that these 
entitlements are not unlimited but can be subjected to constraints in the public 
interest.33 Consequently, whereas the rule of law does not prevent States from 
providing ‘regulatory structures’ for the economy, how can it be ensured that these 
                                                                                                                                         
25  See e.g. Ovey and White, European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd Ed, 2002: Oxford University Press, p 302; 
also Emberland, ibid, pp 48-49; Andreangeli, EU Competition enforcement and Human Rights, 2008: Cheltenham, 
E Elgar, pp 16-17. See e.g. World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions For Markets 
105 (2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fulltext2002.htm, p 133. 
26  See e.g. Cass, ‘Property rights systems and the rule of law’, Boston University School of Law, Working Paper 
Series—Public Law and Legal Theory, #03=-6, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=392783, pp 4-5; 
see also p 7. 
27  Id., pp 16-20; see also Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’, 6th Sir David Williams Lecture, 16 November 2006, 
House of Lords, transcript available at: www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/past_activities/the_rule_of_law_ 
text_transcript_php, pp 2, 5-6; see also p 9. 
28  Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 1944 (reprinted in 2008), Abingdon/New York: Routledge, p 84. 
29  Emberland, op cit, n 24, pp 40-41, 43, 47. 
30  See e.g. Handyside v United Kingdom, [1979-1980] 1 EHRR 737, para 48. See also appl. No 5947/72, Silver v 
United Kingdom, [1983] 5 EHRR 347, para 97. 
31  Hayek, op cit, n 28, pp 37-38; see also Emberland, op cit, n 24, pp 37, 43. 
32  See e.g. Ovey & White, European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd Ed, 2002: Oxford University Press, p 302; 
also Emberland, op cit, n 24, pp 48-49; Andreangeli, EU Competition enforcement and Human Rights, 2008: 
Cheltenham, E Elgar, pp 16-17. 
33  See e.g. Trainor, ‘A comparative analysis of a corporation’s right against self-incrimination’, (1994-95) 18 
Fordham Int’l L J, p 239; see especially pp 2165-2166. 
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frameworks are shaped in a manner that respects and does not unduly hinder the 
enjoyment of these rights?34 
It is argued that these considerations are all the more relevant for competition 
enforcement structures. Although commentators have suggested that free competition 
provides a ‘better way of guiding individual efforts than any other’ and have therefore 
argued in favour of the free market economy, they have also emphasised that, for 
competition to work not only ‘efficiently’ but also ‘well’, it is necessary to establish legal 
structures destined to ensure that markets work ‘beneficially’, especially through the 
appropriate organisation of [inter alia] ‘money … and channels of information’.35  
In this context the ECHR constitutes the ‘rule book’ regulating the conformity of the 
regulatory frameworks in the economic arena with the rule of law principles.36 In 
several judgments the European Court of Human Rights was prepared to extend some 
of the Convention safeguards to individuals or legal entities engaged in professional or 
business activities.37 However, the case law shows that in balancing the right of 
individuals or companies to pursue lawful business activities freely with the pursuit of 
the common good the standards of protection of Convention rights may not have the 
same intensity as in cases concerning ‘non-commercial’ activities.38  
The Court acknowledged that in the control and regulation of the economy 
Contracting States should be allowed a wide margin of appreciation and consequently 
confined its powers of review to considering whether any measures affecting the rights 
of economic actors had been ‘justifiable in principle and proportionate’ to the goal they 
pursued.39 This approach may be contrasted with the scrutiny of measures adopted by 
public authorities to restrain Convention rights in the ‘political’ arena. In Handyside, it 
was held that the discretion of the public authorities as to whether any restriction on 
the applicant’s right to free speech was ‘necessary’ in a democratic society was not 
unlimited.40  
Therefore, the Court would have to be satisfied that in the circumstances of the case, 
the interference with the applicants’ right to free speech responded to a pressing social 
                                                                                                                                         
34  Cass, ‘Property rights systems and the rule of law’, Boston University School of Law, Working Paper 
Series—Public Law and Legal Theory, #03=-6, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=392783, pp 4-5; 
see also pp 7 and 14; also Emberland, op cit, n 24, p 51. 
35  Hayek, op cit, n 28, pp 38-39. 
36  See Emberland, op cit, n 24, pp 48-49; also Andreangeli, op cit, n 32, pp 17-18. 
37  See e.g. appl. No 13710/88, Niemitz v Germany, ser. A No 251-B, [1993] 16 EHRR 17, paras 29-31; also appl. 
No 37971/97, Ste Colas Est and others v France, [2004] 39 EHRR 17, paras 40-41. 
38  See, inter alia, Appl. No 10572/83, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Bermann v Germany, Ser. A No 165, 
[1990] EHRR 161, paras 33-35; also appl. No 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, ser. A No 285, [1994] 18 EHRR 
1, paras 39-41; appl. No 10890/94, Groppera Radio v Switzerland,[1990] 12 EHRR 321, para 48.  
39  Appl. No 10572/83, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Bermann v Germany, op cit, n 38, para 33; also appl. 
No 10890/94, Groppera Radio, ibid., para 48. 
40  Handyside v United Kingdom, [1979-1980] 1 EHRR 737, para 48. See also appl. No 5947/72, Silver v United 
Kngdom, [1983] 5 EHRR 347, para 97. 
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need and was proportionate to the legitimate aim it pursued41 and, without 
reconsidering the ‘merits’ of the measure, would be empowered to review it to ensure 
that the reasons adduced by the authorities to support the scope and intensity of the 
interference were ‘relevant and sufficient’.42 By contrast, although in principle corporate 
entities are entitled to the protection of some of the Convention safeguards, the 
standards applicable to them appear somewhat less exacting than those relevant for 
natural persons.43  
But how can this divergence be justified? It was suggested that this differing approach 
could stem from the ideological differences existing among the Contracting States as 
regards the inclusion of ‘free market friendly’ rights and freedoms in the Convention.44 
It is added that whereas the different treatment of ‘commercial’ vis-à-vis ‘political 
speech’ may be owed by the circumstance that freedom of expression in the ‘political 
arena’ lies at the very core of the values underpinning the Convention, the protection of 
property and economic freedom would be more ‘relative’ values. Therefore, while any 
interference with the freedom to engage in political debate should be carefully 
scrutinised to protect the integrity of the democratic process,45 protecting the right to 
impart and receive information within the market would not deserve an equally 
extensive protection.46 Or, to put it in another way, the farther we move from the ‘core 
values’ of the ECHR, the more lenient the applicable standard is likely to be and, 
consequently, the wider the margin of appreciation for the public authorities becomes.47  
After having illustrated some of the arguments in support of the application of the 
ECHR to corporate entities, it is necessary to briefly address the rationale for the 
relevance of the Convention for EU competition enforcement. It may be recalled that 
the EU is not a party to the Convention.48 However, the lack of accession has not 
prevented the Court from developing a body of rules, part of the general principles of 
Community law, protecting the fundamental rights of individuals and legal entities 
affected by the exercise of powers by the EU institutions.49 In this context, the ECHR 
                                                                                                                                         
41  Id., paras 49-50. 
42  Id., para 50. For commentary, see e.g. Ovey & White, European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd Ed, 2002: 
Oxford University Press, pp 276-77. 
43  See e.g. Emberland, op cit, n 24, pp 128-130; also Andreangeli, op cit, n 32, pp 20-21. 
44  See, inter alia, mutatis mutandis, Kenna, “Housing rights: positive duties and enforceable rights at the European 
Court of Human Rights”, (2008) (2) EHRLR 193, pp 194-195; also Emberland, op cit, n 24, pp 28-29; see 
also p 34. 
45  See, inter alia, appl. No 9815/82, Lingens v Austria, [1986] 8 EHRR 407, paras 40-41; for commentary, see 
Ovey & White, European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd Ed, 2002: Oxford University Press, pp 210-211; also 
Emberland, op cit, n 24, p 192. 
46  See Emberland, op cit, n 24, p 187; also, e.g. Andreangeli, op cit, n 32, p 22. 
47  See e.g. Emberland, op cit, n 24, p 193. 
48  See e.g. appl. No 8030/77, CFDT v European Communities, [1979] 13 D & R 231 at 240. 
49  See e.g. Opinion 2/94, Re: Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, [1996] ECR I-1759; also T-
156/94, Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid v Commission, [1999] ECR II-645, paras 26-27. 
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has been recognised as the principal ‘source of inspiration’ for the interpretation of 
these principles.50  
The applicability of some of the fundamental safeguards contained in the Convention 
to undertakings concerned by antitrust proceedings has long been a ‘hot topic’.51 
Already in its Stenuit report the now defunct European Commission of Human Rights 
held that that the notion of ‘criminal charge’ had a ‘Convention meaning’ independent 
of domestic law52 and determined by a number of factors, such as whether the rules 
allegedly being infringed were of ‘general application’, the severity of the penalty, and 
whether the latter was deterrent and punitive.53 As a result, domestic antitrust 
proceedings, despite being classified as ‘administrative’ by national legislation, were 
‘criminal’ in nature.54  
Despite their initial reluctance to extend the applicability, even indirect, of some of the 
Convention guarantees to competition proceedings,55 the EU courts have been 
increasingly willing to rely on the ECHR in the interpretation of the general principles 
of Community law. For instance, AG Kokott observed in her Opinion to the Dutch 
Electricians Federation case that although the ECHR would not be directly applicable per 
se to the proceedings before the Commission,56 it would however provide guidance as 
to what constitutes a ‘fair procedure’ before the EU institutions.57  
Importantly, the CFI held in its JFE decision that Article 6(1) ECHR and especially of 
the presumption of innocence would be especially relevant in competition cases, due to 
the nature of the infringement and the degree of severity of the penalties likely to be 
                                                                                                                                         
50  See Protocol 8 to the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union, OJ 2008, C115/1; also, Recital IV, Preamble to the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on 
the functioning of the European Union, OJ 2008, C115/1. 
51  See, inter alia, Andreangeli et al., ‘Enforcement by the Commission: The Decisional and Enforcement 
Structure in Antitrust Cases and the Commission’s Fining System’ prepared for the fifth annual conference of 
the Global Competition Law Centre, College of Europe, held in Brussels, June 11-12, 2009. 
52  Appl. No 11598/85, Stenuit v France, [1992] ECC 401, paras 62-63; see also, more recently, appl. No 
15523/89, Schmautzer v Austria, [1996] 16 EHRR 511, para 28. For commentary, inter alia, Boyle, 
‘Administrative justice, judicial review and the right to a fair hearing under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, (1984) PL 89. 
53  See e.g. Case C-198/01, CIF v Autorita’ Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, [2003] ECR I-8055, per AG 
Jacobs, para 52; also case C-105/04 P, NFVGEG v Commission (Re: Dutch Electricians’ cartel), [2006] ECR I-
8725, per AG Kokott, para 107. For commentary, inter alia, Wils, ‘The combination of the investigative and 
prosecutorial function and the adjudicative function in EC antitrust enforcement: a legal and economic 
analysis’ (2004) 27 W. Comp. 201; Andreangeli, op cit, n 32, pp 25 ff. 
54  Appl. No 11598/85, Stenuit v France, [1992] ECC 401, para 56, 61. See also, appl. No 73053/01, Jussila v 
Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, [2007] EHRR 45, para 43. 
55  Case T-156/94, Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid v Commission, [1999] ECR II-645, paras 23-24, 27. 
56  Case C-105/04 P, Netherlandse Federatieve Vereigning voor de Goothandel op Elektroteknisch Gebied v Commission, 
[2006] ECR I-8725, per AG Kokott, para 107, n 57. 
57  Id., para 108. See also Case T-7/89, SA Hercules Chemicals v Commission, [1991] ECR II-1771, per AG 
Vesterdorf, para I.3; also, inter alia, case C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, [1998] ECR I-8417, per AG 
Leger, para 31. 
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imposed on the applicant.58 However, to what extent can the needs of effective 
competition enforcement and more generally of the efficient functioning of regulatory 
structures be balanced against these fundamental rights guarantees?  
On this point, the Strasbourg court held that while the right to a fair trial is in itself 
absolute, whether the applicant had received a ‘fair hearing’ in the individual case would 
depend on the circumstances of the proceedings:59 in fact, the applicable standard of 
protection cannot be determined ‘in isolation’ but must take into account the context in 
which it is invoked and the values affected by the alleged interference. It was concluded 
that although criminal proceedings in principle required the application of strict 
procedural safeguards, due to the gravity characterising them, there may be cases in 
which no such ‘stigma’ was present60 and for which the application of the ‘full’ 
guarantees attending a criminal trial could not be justified.61  
Similarly, in O’Halloran and Francis, concerning the right to silence in administrative 
proceedings aimed at the detection and sanction of motoring offences, it was held that 
although the right to a fair trial is absolute in itself, its constituent elements, including 
the right not to contribute to incriminate oneself, may actually vary in their scope,62 due 
to the circumstances of the case, the nature of the proceedings and the safeguards 
attending the taking of that evidence.63 The Strasbourg court observed that when 
choosing to perform certain activities, individuals often accept, expressly or implicitly, 
to submit to specific obligations and responsibilities within a regulatory regime which 
may therefore limit the reach of their rights in the course of proceedings designed to 
enforce these obligations in the common interest.64 Thus, all the Convention requires is 
respect for the essence of the right to a ‘fair procedure’ in the face of compulsion in the 
taking of evidence.65 
It is concluded that the commitment to fundamental rights’ protection justifies the 
application of some of the Convention guarantees to the investigated firms in 
competition proceedings, albeit through the ‘medium’ of the general principles of EU 
law. However, a question remains open as to how to reconcile the protection of the 
right to a ‘fair procedure’, the right to peacefully enjoy one’s property and the freedom 
to contract with legitimate objectives of public interest.  
                                                                                                                                         
58  Case T-67/00, JFE v Commission, [2004] ECR II-2501, para 178. 
59  See e.g. appl. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, O’ Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, [2008] 46 EHRR 21, 
para 53. 
60  Appl. No 73053/01, Jussila v Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006, [2007] EHRR 45, para 43. 
61  Ibid. See also paras 46-48. 
62  Appl. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, O’ Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, [2008] 46 EHRR 21, para 53. 
63  Ibid. See also appl. No 54810/00, Jalloh v Germany, [2007] 44 EHRR 32, para 117. 
64  Appl. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, O’ Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, [2008] 46 EHRR 21, para 57. 
See also, mutatis mutandis, Brown v Stott, Privy Council, 5 December 2000, [2003] 1 AC 681, per Lord Bingham, 
p 703. 
65  Ibid. 
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The next sections will investigate the impact of the powers enjoyed by the Commission 
to ‘bring the infringement to an end’ on economic freedom and the right to peacefully 
enjoy property granted to the investigated firms under the ECHR. They will also 
consider the Convention standards of protection against the background of the US case 
law relating to the protection of freedom of covenant under the US Constitution’s ‘Due 
Process’ clause.  
3.2. Economic freedoms and property rights ‘European style’: looking for a ‘fair 
balance’ 
Section 3.1 considered a number of arguments supporting the application of certain 
guarantees enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and suggested 
that the protection of property and of the freedom of enterprise in a market economy 
is compatible with principles of human dignity, personal liberty and other rights, 
including freedom of association. This section will analyse the current standards of 
protection afforded by the ECHR to the right to peacefully enjoy one’s property and to 
the freedom of contract.  
The right to enjoy property is enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol I to the ECHR, 
according to which ‘every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possession’. This is not, however, an absolute right, but may be limited, subject 
to the requirements laid down in that provision.66 In respect to the notion of a 
‘deprivation’ of property, as opposed to the imposition of ‘controls’ over its use, the 
European Court of Human Rights took the view that in assessing the impact that the 
measure complained of has had on her legal position regard should be had to the 
circumstances of each case and especially to the ‘realities’ of the position of the 
individual applicant.67 Thus, the decisive question appears to be whether the applicant 
was deprived of her ‘title’ to the possessions so as to be no longer able to dispose of 
them or the measure adopted by the public authorities had only affected her ability to 
enjoy the property.68  
A similarly flexible approach has informed the interpretation of the notion of 
‘possession’ in the ECHR. According to the Strasbourg Court, this concept should be 
given an ‘autonomous meaning’69 and encompass tangible and intangible goods and, in 
appropriate circumstances, the ‘legitimate expectation’ to the acquisition of a right.70 
Intellectual property rights have been held to fall within the remit of Article 1, Protocol 
                                                                                                                                         
66  See e.g. appl. No 44302/02, Pye (Oxford) Ltd and another v United Kingdom, judgment of 30 August 2007, para 
52. 
67  Appl. No 7151/75-7152/75, Sporrong & Lonroth v Sweden, [1983] 5 EHRR 35, para 63. 
68  See e.g, appl. No 43278/98, Velikovi and others v Bulgaria, [2009] 48 EHRR 27, para 159-160; cf. Appl. 
17647/04, Edwards v Malta, judgment of 14 January 2007, not yet reported, para 59-60. 
69  See e.g. appl. 58472/00, Dima v Romania, judgment of 16 November 2006, unrep, para 34. 
70  Inter alia, appl. No 17849/91, Pressos Compania Naviera v Belgium, [1996] 21 EHRR 301, para 31, 33; also, appl. 
8543/79, Van Marle v the Netherlands, [1986] 6 EHRR 483, para 39-41; appl. No 44912/98, Kopecky v Slovakia, 
judgment of 28 September 2004, para 52. See also, mutatis mutandis, appl. No 13427/87, Stran Greek Refineries 
and another v Greece, [1995] 19 EHRR 293, para 60. 
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I.71 In the Anheuser Busch decision72 the Court’s Grand Chamber stated that an 
application for registration of a trademark could constitute a ‘possession’ for the 
purpose of the ECHR73 due to the ‘legal and financial rights and interests’ arising from 
it, which are liable to confer it a specific economic value74 and therefore a ‘proprietary’ 
nature.75 
It was noted above that at the core of the ECHR scrutiny of measures affecting 
property rights is the extent to which they struck a ‘fair balance’ between the public 
interest it pursued and the protection of the rights of the individual or legal person 
concerned. The Strasbourg Court has indicated several requirements that should be 
satisfied: any constraint on the right to enjoy one’s property should be ‘prescribed by 
law’ - in other words, it must find a legal basis in domestic provisions and the latter 
must be ‘sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable’.76 Further, that constraint must 
have a legitimate aim and pursue the ‘general interest of the community’77 and, finally, 
be ‘necessary’ to achieve that objective of public interest.  
The Court recognised that although public authorities enjoyed a considerable margin of 
appreciation in the assessment of this requirement,78 their discretion would remain 
subject to ‘European supervision’ as to whether a ‘fair balance’ had been maintained 
between the ‘demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements 
of protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’,79 on the basis of the ‘overall 
examination of the various interests in issue’.80  
The Strasbourg court would have to be satisfied that the measure had ensured a 
‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised’,81 taking into account the scope of discretion enjoyed by the 
authorities in applying the relevant rules and their uncertainty82 and the nature and 
inherent ‘fairness’ of the proceedings,83 including the possibility to challenge the 
                                                                                                                                         
71  See e.g. appl. No 28743/03, Melnychuk v Ukraine, admissibility decision of 5 July 2005, unreported, para 3. 
72  Appl. No 73049/01, Anheuser Busch v Portugal, [2007] 45 EHRR 36, para 72. 
73  Id., para 75. 
74  Id., para 76. 
75  Id., para 78. 
76  Appl. No 33202/96, Beyeler v Italy, [2001] 33 EHRR 52, para 109. See also appl. No 9006/80, Lithgow v United 
Kingdom, [1985] 7 EHRR 56, para 110. 
77  Appl. No 33202/96, Beyeler v Italy, ibid, para 111. 
78  Appl. No 44302/02, Pye (Oxford) Ltd and another v United Kingdom, judgment of 30 August 2007, para 55. 
79  Appl. No 44302/02, Pye (Oxford) Ltd and another v United Kingdom, ibid, para 53. 
80  Appl. No 25088/95, Chassagnou v France, [2000] 29 EHRR 615, para 75; see also appl. 9006/80, Lithgow v 
United Kingdom, op cit, n 76, para 120-21; appl. No 44302/02, Pye (Oxford) Ltd and another v United Kingdom, op 
cit, n 76, para 55. 
81  Appl. No 25088/95, Chassagnou v France, ibid, para 82-83, 85. 
82  Appl. No 33202/96, Beyeler v Italy, op cit, n 76, para 110.  
83  Appl. 13616/88, Hentrich v France, [1996] 21 EHRR 199, para 45. 
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findings and assessments made by the authorities concerned by way of an appeal.84 
Another key consideration in the assessment of the proportionality of an interference 
with property rights is the existence of compensation for the aggrieved individuals or 
legal persons. Thus, expropriations85 and controls on the use of property without 
compensation or remuneration are normally considered to be a ‘disproportionate’ 
interference with the applicant’s rights.86  
Having regard to the standards of protection of freedom to contract the European 
Court of Human Rights stated in Ghigo v Malta that measures controlling the amount of 
rent that landlords could impose on their tenants constituted a form of ‘control on the 
use’ of that property. Since the right ‘to receive a market rent and to terminate leases’ 
was the expression of the owner’s right to exploit the economic value of the property,87 
it enjoyed the protection of the ECHR.88 
Consequently, state authorities, despite being entitled to adopt wide ranging housing 
legislation to ensure the ‘just distribution … of housing resources’89 were obliged to 
safeguard the ‘essence’ of the rights enshrined in Article 1, Protocol I.90 Regard must be 
had to ‘the conditions for reducing the rent’ in individual cases and to ‘the extent of the 
State’s interference with freedom of contract and contractual relations in the lease 
market’, including the length of the interference and the amount of rent paid to the 
landlord91 and the existence of fair and appropriate remedies for the protection of their 
rights.92  
It can be concluded that the ECHR protects the right to enjoy one’s possessions, 
whether tangible or intangible, and the freedom of covenant of ‘everyone’ within the 
jurisdiction of the Contracting States. However, these rights are not absolute but can be 
subjected to limits in the public interest and providing that a ‘fair balance’ is struck 
                                                                                                                                         
84  Id., para. 42, 46; see also para 49. 
85  See e.g. appl. No 17849/91, Pressos Compania Naviera v Belgium, [1996] 21 EHRR 301, paras 31, 33; see also 
para 39. 
86  See appl. No 19247/03, Balan v Moldova, judgment of 29 January 2008, para. 38-39; also para 46. See also 
appl. No 13092/87 and 13984/88, Holy Monasteries v Greece, [1995] 20 EHRR 1, paras 80-83, 85; appl. 
9006/80, Lithgow v United Kingdom, cit., para 205; more recently, appl. No 19589/92, B v the Netherlands, 
Commission Report, 19 May 1994, paras 71-72; see also paras 60, 65-66. 
87  Appl. No 31122/05, Ghigo v Malta, judgment of 26 September 2006, unrep, para 50. 
88  Id., para 49. See also appl. No 10522/83, Mellacher v Austria, [1990] 12 EHRR 391, paras 43-44. 
89  Appl. No 31122/05, Ghigo v Malta, op cit, n 87, para 58. Also, appl. No 22774/93, Imoobiliare Saffi v Italy, 
[2000] 30 EHRR 756, para 52. 
90  Appl. No 31122/05, Ghigo v Malta, op cit, n 87, paras 62, 68. See also paras 65-66, 68-69. See also, mutatis 
mutandis, appl. No 31443/96, Broniowski v Poland, [2005] 40 EHRR 31, para 144; more recently, appl. No 
35014/97, Hutten-Czapska v Poland, judgment of 19 June 2006, [2007] 45 EHRR 4, paras 195-196, 200-202, 
217, 223-224. 
91  Id., para 68; see also paras 65-66, 68-69. See also, mutatis mutandis, appl. No 31443/96, Broniowski v Poland, 
[2005] 40 EHRR 31, para 144; more recently, appl. No 35014/97, Hutten-Czapska v Poland, judgment of 19 
June 2006, [2007] 45 EHRR 4, paras 195-196, 200-202, 217, 223-224. 
92  Appl. No 24/1994, Scollo v Italy, [1996] 22 EHRR 514, paras 26-27, 38-40, 44. See also appl. No 46129, 
Zvolski and Zvolska v Slovakia, judgment of 22 November 2002, unrep, paras 59-60, 73-75. 
Between Economic Freedom and Effective Competition Enforcement 
  (2010) 6(2) CompLRev 
 
238 
between the ‘common good’ and the essence of the applicant’s rights.93 The next 
section will examine the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in 
respect to forced IP licences. 
3.3. Intellectual property rights, progress and competition in the ECHR 
framework 
Section 3.2 illustrated that Article 1, Protocol I to the ECHR encompasses intangible as 
well as tangible goods and that its aim is striking a ‘fair balance’ between the need to 
protect the essence of these rights and the achievement of goals in the public interest. 
This section will address the position adopted by the Strasbourg court in relation to 
compulsory intellectual property licenses. Although these cases have been rare, they 
represent a peculiar example of ‘interference’ with Convention rights in order to 
encourage industrial innovation. 
One such case was that of Smith Kline and French Laboratories v the Netherlands,94 which 
was the subject of a friendly settlement95 and was therefore only dealt with at 
admissibility stage by the now defunct European Commission on Human Rights. 
According to the Commission report, the grant of a ‘compulsory licence’ constituted a 
form of ‘control on the use of property’ of the patent holder.96 It was held that one of 
the essential attributes of patent rights was the conferral ‘on its owner [of] the sole right 
of exploitation’ of the invention and that the grant of ‘rights to others under that patent 
[was not] an inevitable or automatic consequence’.97 Consequently, it was indispensable 
to assess whether imposing a duty to licence was ‘prescribed by law’ and pursued ‘a 
legitimate aim in a proportionate manner’.98  
The Commission observed that many Contracting States provided frameworks allowing 
‘other persons to make use of a particular patented product’ and that in this area they 
should enjoy a significant margin of appreciation:99 forced licences could be granted 
only to ‘encourage technological and economic development’ and if the disclosure of 
the invention could result in the supply of a ‘new product or process … capable of 
industrial application’.100 
It was held that the scope of the licence at issue was limited to allowing the licensee to 
employ its own invention101 and that the holder of the ‘primary’ patent had been 
                                                                                                                                         
93  See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Daintith, ‘The constitutional protection of economic rights’ (2004) 2(1) Int’l J of 
Const’l L 56 at 84-86. 
94  Appl. No 12633/87, decision of 4 October 1990. 
95  Report of the European Commission on Human Rights, 10 July 1991. 
96  Appl. No 12633/87, decision of 4 October 1990, part III. 
97  Ibid. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
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entitled to royalties.102 Thus, the Commission, in declaring the application admissible, 
stated that the respondent state had not overstepped the limits of its discretion and, 
consequently, the applicant’s rights had not been infringed.103 
The Smith Kline report suggests that any forced IP licence must provide for adequate 
compensation and be limited in its scope to reconcile the competing interests of the IP 
holder to the protection of the value of its investment, for the purpose of furthering 
innovation, and to the continued innovation of the industry on the part of the holder’s 
rivals.104 However, it remains open to question whether the imposition of similar 
obligation for the purpose of restoring competition, as envisaged in the application of 
Article 102 TFEU, satisfies these criteria. After briefly examining the rules protecting 
property rights and freedom of contract in US constitutional law, the next sections will 
attempt to answer these questions. 
3.4. Freedom of covenant and property rights in the US Constitution: brief 
remarks 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 examined the standards of protection applicable to the right to 
enjoy property and to freedom of contract under the ECHR. Before moving on to 
consider the extent to which the restrictions on these rights imposed by the European 
Commission, in the exercise of its function as competition enforcer, comply with the 
ECHR standards, it is helpful to consider, albeit briefly, the degree of protection 
afforded to them under the US Constitution.  
According to the Fifth Amendment, ‘no person shall [inter alia] … be deprived of … 
property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation’. In addition, the ‘due process clause’ contained in the 
Fourteenth Amendment may be relied on vis-à-vis the federate states to seek protection 
of the individual’s freedom of covenant.105  
The case law appears to suggest that a shift has taken place from a liberal approach to 
freedom of contract and of enterprise, in which the rights of the individual tended to 
take precedence over the exercise of public powers, to a more ‘interventionist’ 
approach, as a result of which the Supreme Court has been more willing to justify state 
action in the public interest that encroaches in the individual’s economic freedoms. It 
was held in Lochner that ‘the general right to make a contract in relation to his business 
is part of the liberty of the individual’ and is therefore protected by the ‘Due Process’ 
clauses contained in the US Constitution.106  
                                                                                                                                         
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 See e.g. Ohly et al., ‘Artistic freedom versus privacy—a delicate balance’ (2008) 38(5) IIC 526 at 551-552; also 
Geiger, ‘Constitutionalising intellectual property law? The influence of fundamental rights on intellectual 
property in the European Union’ (2006) 37(4) IIC 371 at 399. 
105 See e.g. Mayer, ‘Substantive due process rediscovered: the rise and fall of liberty of contract’ (2008-09) 60 
Mercer L Rev 563 at 572 ff. 
106 Lochner v State of New York, (1905) 198 US 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, per Peckham J at 541. 
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Nonetheless, the Court recognised that each State enjoyed ‘certain powers … 
somewhat vaguely termed police powers’ that limit the rights of liberty and property 
enjoyed by each individual for the ‘safety, general health and morals and general welfare 
of the public’107 and must be exercised within the bounds of ‘constitutional restraint’.108 
The key question therefore is whether the restriction imposed on the applicant’s rights 
constituted a ‘fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of police power’ or instead was 
an ‘unreasonable, unnecessary and disproportionate interference with the right of the 
individual to his personal liberty’ and in that context of his freedom of contract.109 The 
act in question must therefore bear a ‘direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end 
itself must be appropriate and legitimate’.110  
On the merits, the Supreme Court found for the applicant: it was held that the statute 
at issue, in which the legislature of the State of New York had set a maximum number 
of working hours for persons employed in certain trades, constituted a ‘meddlesome 
interference with the freedoms of the individual’.111 Although these measures pursued 
the legitimate goal of protection of public health, the legislature had not proven the 
existence of any ‘fair ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that there [was] a 
material danger to the public health of the employees’, in the absence of any limits on 
the number of hours that they could work each day.112 
Lochner was widely criticised and the limited remit of this paper does not allow for a 
detailed consideration of these arguments.113 Mr Justice Holmes, dissenting, argued that 
the case had been ‘decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country 
[did] not entertain’ and that the Constitution could not be constructed in the light of 
either a ‘paternalistic’ approach to the relationship between the individual and the state 
or of a ‘laissez faire’ attitude to economic freedom.114 Mr Justice Harlan added that the 
right to freely enter in contracts could be subjected to limitations ‘for the common 
good and the well-being of society’.115 
In later cases, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from this supposedly ‘pro free 
market’ stance. In Carolene Products116 it held that the authorities retained the power to 
regulate commerce for reasons of public interest and that it was within the legitimate 
                                                                                                                                         
107 Ibid. 
108 Id., p.542. 
109 Id., p. 543. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Id., p. 545. 
112 Ibid. 
113 See e.g. Burling, ‘The challenges of due process, 1983 and property rights’, ALI-ABA working paper, 2004, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=666987; also Bernstein, ‘Bolling, equal protection, due process and 
Lochnerphobia’, Law and Economics working paper series no 05-14, available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=761926.  
114 Lochner v State of New York, (1905) 198 US 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, per Holmes J, pp 546-547. 
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powers of the legislature to exclude from trade products whose consumption may be 
‘injurious to the public health, morals or welfare’.117 Thus, a measure outlawing the sale 
of products that failed to meet ‘a minimum of particular nutritive elements in a widely 
used article of food’ to protecting the public from fraudulent substitution had not 
violated the 14th Amendment.118  
The Supreme Court would not, therefore, declare legislative measures affecting 
economic activities unconstitutional unless ‘in the light of the facts made known or 
generally assumed [they were] … of such a character as to preclude the assumption that 
[they have] … some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the 
legislators’,119 in light of the circumstances of the case and without going as far as to 
‘second-guess’ the choice of the legislature.120  
The approach adopted in Carolene was upheld in other judgments concerning the 
legality of legal monopolies and measures fixing prices. According to Nebbia ‘neither 
property rights nor contract rights [were] absolute’ but could be limited to what was 
necessary ‘to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of [the] people and to 
provide for [their] general welfare’.121 A legislative measure affecting the individuals’ 
rights and freedoms would be consistent with the ‘Due Process’ clause if it was ‘not … 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious’ and imposed only those limitations on the 
complainant’s rights that bear ‘a real and substantial relation’ with their objective.122 It 
was concluded that legislation introduced in the State of New York to control prices on 
the sale of milk had not infringed the 14th Amendment. In the view of the Supreme 
Court, since the Constitution did not provide an absolute guarantee for the freedom to 
engage in and conduct a business activity, States’ legislatures and Congress could 
restrict the freedom of individuals to conduct their business in the public interest.123  
Roberts J emphasised that although the growing importance of free competition had 
led both the States’ and the federal legislature to prohibit monopolies or other forms of 
control on prices and trading conditions,124 there may be circumstances in which 
‘existing maladjustments’ in the functioning of individual markets could be ‘corrected’ 
by public intervention even though that adversely impacted on the freedom of the 
entrepreneurs concerned to set prices for their goods or services.125 If these measures 
bore ‘a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose’ and were not discriminatory 
or arbitrary, they would remain consistent with the Due Process clause, without the 
                                                                                                                                         
117 Per Stone J at 781. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Id., p 783. 
120 Id., pp 783-784. 
121 Nebbia v State of New York, 291 US 502, 54 S Ct 505, per Roberts J at 523. 
122 Id., p 525. 
123 Id., pp 527-528. 
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Courts being able to adjudge the ‘wisdom of the policy’, its ‘adequacy or 
predictability’.126 
It is therefore concluded that the US Supreme Court recognises economic freedom, 
freedom of covenant and the right to enjoy one’s property as one of the rights 
protected by the US Constitution and relies on the ‘Due Process’ clause to prevent 
undue interferences with it.127 However, their protection is not unlimited but can be 
subject to constraints for the common good of society, subject to criteria of 
‘proportionality’ and ‘fairness’.128 
The next section will therefore briefly consider how the US Supreme Court has 
addressed the issues arising from the imposition of restrictions on economic freedom 
of firms in the application of the US Sherman Act, and especially its section 2. 
3.5. Of intellectual property rights and antitrust infringements: the US Supreme 
Court case law on refusals to deal 
Section 3.4 briefly illustrated the approach adopted by the US Supreme Court to 
restrictions of property rights and freedom of covenant imposed by public authorities 
both at state and at federal level in the light of the Due Process clause. However, the 
regulation of commercial activities is only one of the areas in which public authorities 
have sought to restrict freedom of covenant and to dispose of property: antitrust 
enforcement is another one. Nonetheless, Courts have been reluctant to restrain the 
freedom of undertakings to discontinue its business dealings with other firms.  
It was held in Colgate, a case concerning an alleged infringement of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, that in principle the antitrust rules could not be relied upon to impose a 
duty to deal with another company, especially a rival.129 The Court took the view that 
the objective of that Act was to protect the freedom of trade of every individual or 
corporation and that, consequently, its provisions could not be read as limiting the 
discretion to choose business partners or the conditions of trade, unless it could be 
demonstrated that the firm had acted for the ‘purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly’.130 On the merits it was concluded that the respondent, by refusing to 
continue supplying retailers who had declined to sell its product above an agreed price, 
had not infringed Section 1 of the Sherman Act.131  
                                                                                                                                         
126 Id., p 538. Cf. New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 52 S Ct 371, see especially pp 373-375. 
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The same principle appears to have had a more limited application in cases concerning 
allegations of infringement of section 2 of the Act.132 In Lorain Journal the Supreme 
Court ruled that the attempt on the part of a publisher to boycott a competing radio 
station by refusing to provide advertising to third parties who also advertised on air 
with the latter violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.133 The Court rejected the 
appellant’s argument that its conduct was justified by its right to select freely its 
customers and held that the latter was ‘neither absolute nor exempt from regulation’.134 
Accordingly, refusing to deal with a specific customer could result in an infringement of 
the antitrust rules if its purpose was the monopolisation of the market for the supply of 
advertising.135  
The Supreme Court upheld the decree imposing on the applicant an obligation to 
supply advertising space to customers, regardless of whether the latter had stipulated 
similar contracts with the competing radio station. It took the view that the measure 
was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the aim it sought to achieve, being limited 
as to its duration and scope, since it concerned well identified commercial activities, and 
subject to limited powers of judicial supervision.136  
It could be argued that the Supreme Court in Lorain confirmed the approach developed 
in cases such as Nebbia or Carolene Products. This judgment reiterated that freedom of 
covenant could be subjected to limits for the purpose of achieving a public interest goal 
- in this case, that of preserving competition in a market characterised by the presence 
of a monopolist. However, any such restriction should not exceed what is ‘reasonably 
consistent with the circumstances of the case’ and not impose unduly burdensome 
limitations on the monopolist thus striking a ‘fair balance’ between the legitimate 
interests of the monopolists and the needs of genuine, undistorted competition.137 
In the later Aspen Skiing case138 the Supreme Court confirmed that a monopolist, 
despite being under no general duty to cooperate with other firms and especially with 
its rivals, did not enjoy an absolute right to select its customers and to participate in 
specific commercial ventures139 and that, just as in Lorain Journal, its right to refuse to 
deal with a competitor could be limited in the interest of undistorted competition.140 
The Court emphasised that although the appellant’s behaviour was not as ‘relentless 
and predatory’ as in Lorain Journal, it evidenced its willingness to ‘squeeze’ a smaller 
                                                                                                                                         
132 See e.g. Lopatka and Page, ‘Bargaining and monopolisation: in search of the “boundary of section 2 liability” 
between Aspen and Trinko’ (2005) 73 Antirust. L J 115, pp 125-126. 
133 Lorain Journal v US, 342 US 143, 72 S. Ct. 181, per Burton J at 186. 
134 Id., p 187.  
135 Ibid. 
136 Id., p 188. 
137 See Mayer, op ci, n 105, pp 638-639; see also p 657. 
138 Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highland Skiing Co, 472 US 585, 105 S. Ct. 2847. 
139 Id., pp 600-601. 
140 Id., p 603; see also pp 604-605, 607-608. 
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competitor out of the market.141 Accordingly, imposing a limit on the appellant’s 
freedom to (refuse to) contract was justified in the light of the circumstances. 
The position adopted in Aspen may, however, be contrasted with the later Trinko 
decision,142 which concerned allegations of monopolisation on the part of Verizon, the 
incumbent in the US telecommunication market: the incumbent had been accused of 
engaging in the ‘constructive’ refusal to grant access to its infrastructure, namely, of 
downgrading the quality of its services on the wholesale segment of the 
telecommunication market with a view to damaging the position of its rivals on the 
retail segment.  
This decision was very widely debated and cannot be examined in any depth in this 
paper. It is suggested that Mr Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, took a rather 
restrictive view of what could constitute an exception to the general principle expressed 
in Colgate.143 He held that the refusal by a monopolist to deal with a rival would infringe 
Section 2 only if it could be shown that it had been motivated by ‘anti-competitive 
malice’ and, having regard to the nature of the activity and the structure of the market, 
it could have only been justified as a means of excluding a rival from the relevant 
market.144 
The circumstance that the market for telecommunications was subject to regulation and 
that Verizon had already been sanctioned by the sector authorities for the infringement 
of its obligation to grant access to its infrastructure vis-à-vis its customers, an obligation 
that had originated from legislation and not from a contractual arrangement, weighed 
heavily in the decision of the Court not to impose a separate antitrust remedy on the 
respondent.145 However, it is also clear from the judgment itself that the 1996 US 
Telecommunications Act had not expressly pre-empted the Sherman Act from applying 
to prima facie exclusionary practices.146 As a result, commentators doubted that the 
approach prevailing in Trinko could allow the courts to strike an appropriate balance 
between the need to encourage investment on the part of the monopolist and the 
objective of ensuring genuine competition in all circumstances.147  
Other authors proposed a different reading of the judgment. It was argued that Trinko 
could be reconciled with a view of innovation which can be fully justified in the light of 
an idea of competition as ‘growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
                                                                                                                                         
141 Id., pp 610-611. 
142 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398, 124 S Ct 872. 
143 Id., p 408. 
144 Id., pp 409-410. See e.g. Fox, ‘Is there life in Aspen after Trinko? The silent revolution of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act’ (2005-2006) 73 Antitrust L J 153 at 167. 
145 Verizon Communications Inc. v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398 (2004), per Scalia J at 411; see 
also p 407. 
146 Id., pp 404-405. 
147 Inter alia, Fox, ‘Is there life in Aspen after Trinko? The silent revolution of section 2 of the Sherman Act’ 
(2005-2006) 73 Antitrust L J 153 at 167. 
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product, business acumen or historical accident’.148 Thus, although its rationale could 
not be easily applicable outside the realm of ‘regulated industries’,149 Trinko’s selective 
application of the Aspen principles seems to indicate a trend toward ‘tipping the scales’ 
in favour of encouraging ‘powerful’ firms to continue innovating rather than of 
supporting competition ‘as a process’ across the whole industry. 150  
Consequently, it could be argued that Trinko, consistently with Lochner’s ‘presumption in 
favour of liberty’,151 upheld business freedom, unless there was a ‘compelling reason’ 
for interfering with it to avoid that the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
could hamper the incentive to innovate even in cases involving powerful firms.152 
However, what remains to some degree undetermined is the extent of that incentive: 
how far should the monopolist remain free to choose its business partners? Could this 
freedom ever be restrained to safeguard competition ‘as a process’?  
A useful reference can be made to judgments concerning refusals to licence IPRs and 
to sell products covered by patents or trademarks. In the Independent Service Organisations 
(ISO) decision153 the Federal Circuit of the Court of Appeals held that the ownership of 
intellectual property rights, while it does not confer a ‘privilege to violate the antitrust 
laws’, does not constitute irrefutable proof of market power being enjoyed by their 
holder154 or oblige their holder to grant licences allowing others to take advantage of 
the fruits of her investment and innovation.155 However, a refusal to licence by a 
powerful firm would breach the antitrust rules if the intellectual property right had been 
‘obtained through knowing and wilful fraud’ or the litigation was a ‘mere sham to cover 
what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor’.156  
Consequently, the holder of an intellectual property right would be in principle free to 
exploit its invention, if necessary by refusing to allow other to use it unless it could be 
shown that, in so doing, it is extending its market power ‘improperly’, i.e. by acting 
                                                                                                                                         
148 United States v Grinnell Corp., 384 US, at 570-571, 86 S. Ct. at 1005. 
149 See e.g. Economides, ‘Vertical leverage and the sacrifice principle: why the Supreme Court got Trinko 
wrong’, NET Institute Working paper #05-05, Stern Business School, NYU, pp 28-29, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=797142; see also Fox, ‘A tale of two jurisdictions and an orphan case: antitrust, 
intellectual property, and refusal to deal’ (2004-2005) 28 Fordham Int’l L J 952 at 965-66. 
150 Lopatka and Page, ‘Bargaining and monopolisation: in search of the “boundary of section 2 liability” between 
Aspen and Trinko’ (2005) 73 Antit. L J 115, pp 128-129; see also Gavil, ‘Exclusionary distribution strategies by 
dominant firms: striking a better balance’ (2004) 72 Antitrust L J 3 at 34.  
151 See e.g. Cavanagh, ‘Trinko: a kinder, gentler approach to dominant firms under the antitrust laws?’ (2007) 59 
Me L Rev 111 at 127; see also Gavil, ‘Exclusionary distribution strategies by dominant firms: striking a better 
balance’ (2004) 72 Antitrust L J 3 at 34; cf. Meese, ‘Property, Aspen, and refusals to deal’ (2005-2005) 73 
Antitrust L J 81 at 85-86. 
152 Meese, ‘Property, Aspen, and refusals to deal’ (2005-2005) 73 Antitrust L J 81 at 94-95; see also pp 98-99. 
153 In re: Independent Service Organisations antitrust litigation CSU, LLC and others v Xerox, 203 F 3d 1322. 
154 Id., p 1325. 
155 Id., p 1326. See US v Colgate & Co, 250 US 300 at 307. 
156 Ibid. 
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‘beyond the scope of the patent’157 and regardless of the ‘subjective motivation’ at the 
basis of the holder’s conduct.158  
In Grumman159 the Federal Court of Appeals explained that this principle constituted an 
implied exception to the scope of the antitrust rules to reward the investment in 
innovation made by the holder of the patent or copyright and thereby promote 
consumer welfare in the long term.160 The Court stated that the incentive to pursuing 
technical development would be put at risk by allowing the wider competition law 
scrutiny of the patent or copyright holder’s refusal to grant a licence to a third party161 
since it would deny the owner of IPRs any ‘appropriate compensation’ for their 
efforts.162  
The brief analysis of the ISO and Grumman decisions seems to suggest that the scope of 
the ‘optimal incentive’ to innovate afforded to the IPRs owner is relatively wide163 and 
therefore should find a limit only when it could be shown that the IP holder was 
‘abusing its patent’.164 However, it remains open to question whether the limited scope 
left for antitrust intervention could actually foster the attainment of genuine 
competition and consumer welfare.165 
This point was addressed by the 9th Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals in Kodak:166 
Beezer J reiterated that the right to refuse to deal with another firm, especially a rival, 
despite being ‘highly valued’, was not unlimited.167 Thus he held that this right could 
not be exercised to exclude competition from the same or from a neighbouring market 
vis-à-vis the one in which the monopolist enjoys market power.168 It was held that the 
application of the competition rules and the protection of the exclusivity granted to the 
IPRs owner by the patent laws pursued objectives of economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare by, respectively, ‘promoting a competitive market place’ and fuelling 
new investment and innovation.169 Therefore, the Court held that ownership of an IP 
                                                                                                                                         
157 Id., pp 1327-1328. 
158 Id., p 1327. See also, mutatis mutandis, Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Services, 504 US 451, 112 S Ct 2072, 
pp 2087-88 and 2090-2091. 
159 Data General Corp v Grumman System Support Corp, 36 F. 3d 1147. 
160 Id., p 1186. 
161 Ibid. See also, inter alia, Telecom Technical Services Inc v Rolm Co, 388 F. 3d 820 at 826-827. 
162 See e.g. Bauer, ‘Refusals to deal with competitors by owners of patents and copyrights: reflections on the 
Image Technical and Xerox decisions’ (2006) 55 DePaul L Rev 1211 at 1223. 
163 Id., p 1220. 
164 Inter alia, Bauer, op cit, n 162, pp 1241-1242. 
165 Id., pp 1221-22. 
166 Image Technical Services Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 125 F Rd 1195. 
167 Id., p 1210. 
168 Id., p 1211. 
169 Id., pp 1214-1215. 
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right did not provide a ‘blanket’ immunity from antitrust liability and could not be 
exercised to exclude rivals from the market.170  
Thus, Kodak’s refusal to continue supplying its customers with spare parts for its own 
products constituted an infringement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act since it revealed 
an ‘exclusionary intent’ and had injured the customers’ interests since to allow an IP 
owner to exercise its rights in such a way as to kick out a rival from a neighbouring 
market would be tantamount as to allow her to extend the scope of her IPRs beyond 
their statutory remit.171 
Commenting on the Kodak judgment, it was suggested that just as in ISO, the Court of 
Appeals was well aware of the difficulties arising from policing monopolists’ unilateral 
behaviour.172 However, in the light of the circumstances of the case and especially of 
the fact that Kodak had discontinued an existing pattern of distribution of some of its 
products, the 9th Circuit was prepared to extend the rationale of Grumman to a case in 
which the patent owner had sought to extend an otherwise lawful monopoly ‘beyond’ 
its statutory limits by seeking to exclude rivals from the market.173  
It is concluded that the US Superior courts, while confirming the need to strike a ‘fair 
balance’ between the effective protection of IP rights and genuine competition, have 
adopted a cautious approach to the imposition of duties to license for the purpose of 
enforcing the antitrust rules. The next section will examine whether the EU rules 
governing antitrust remedies are compatible with the ECHR requirements and in that 
context consider the extent to which the US law principles concerning these issues can 
provide a suitable alternative to resolve possible conflicts between the two European 
sets of standards.  
4. ANTITRUST REMEDIES IN THE EU AND THE PROTECTION OF “ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS”: HOW TO STRIKE A “FAIR BALANCE” BETWEEN THE NEEDS OF 
COMPETITION AND THE RIGHTS OF POWERFUL FIRMS? 
4.1. Structural and behavioural remedies and the right to ‘peacefully enjoy one’s 
possessions’: are the Commission’s powers consistent with the ECHR? 
Section 2 examined the principles governing antitrust remedies and illustrated how the 
framing of behavioural remedies to end a competition infringement must conform to 
criteria of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ and depends on the features of the breach as 
well as on the relevant substantive rules.174 It also argued that the criteria governing the 
                                                                                                                                         
170 Id., pp 1215-1216. 
171 Id., pp 1218-1219. 
172 See id., pp 1211, 1217-1218; for commentary, Carrier, ‘Refusals to license intellectual property after Trinko’ 
(2006) 55 DePaul L Rev 1191 at 1204. 
173 Id., p 1216; see, inter alia, Bauer, op cit, n 162, pp 1233-1234. 
174 E.g. Case T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission, [2007] ECR II-2601, paras 101, 104-107; for commentary, see inter 
alia, Wind, ‘Remedies and sanctions under Article 82 of the EC Treaty’ (2005) 26(12) ECLR 659.  
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EU antitrust remedies imposed for unlawful refusals to deal and to license may not 
strike a balance between genuine competition and the need to encourage innovation.  
Thereafter, section 3 examined the standards of protection afforded by the ECHR to 
the right to enjoy property and argued that although the Contracting States retain the 
power to impose limits on their enjoyment under specific circumstances and in the 
public interest, they are under the obligation to ensure that the essence of these rights is 
not irremediably impaired.175  
This section will consider the extent to which the current approach to antitrust 
remedies, especially those imposed by the Commission in ‘refusals to licence’ cases, 
under Article 102 TFEU, is compatible with the standards of protection enjoyed by the 
peaceful enjoyment of property, especially intellectual, and by freedom of contract 
under the European Convention. It is reminded that the choice of antitrust remedies 
must remain subject to the principle of proportionality,176 according to which ‘the 
burdens imposed on undertakings in order to bring an infringement to an end [must] 
not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective sought, namely re-
establishment of compliance with the rules infringed’. 
In the light of the approaches adopted, respectively, by the EU institutions and by the 
European Court of Human Rights, it is not entirely clear whether the concept of 
‘proportionality’ at the basis of the framing of antitrust remedies according to Council 
Regulation No 1/2003 is as exacting as the requirements dictated by the Convention.177 
On this point, the European Convention on Human Rights has been interpreted as 
providing a degree of protection to the freedom of ‘everyone’ to decide whether and 
with whom to stipulate contracts, this principle being a component of economic and 
personal freedom.178  
Having regard specifically to compulsory patent licences, the Smith Kline v the Netherlands 
case179 stated that these constituted forms of ‘control on the use of property’, in 
accordance with Article 1, Protocol I,180 which should only be allowed in order to 
further ‘technological and economic development’. Thus, the individual or company 
requesting them should demonstrate that thanks to the licence a ‘new product or 
                                                                                                                                         
175 Supra, sect 3.2; see e.g. appl. No 25088/95, Chassagnou v France, [2000] 29 EHRR 615, para 82-85. 
176 See e.g. Commission Decision 94/19/EEC, Sea Link v Stena Line, OJ 1994, L15/8; also joined Cases 6/7/73, 
ICI and Commercial Solvents v Commission, [1974] ECR 223; more recently, Case T201/04, Microsoft v Commission, 
[2007] ECR II-3601, para 1276. 
177 For commentary, see, inter alia, Montagnani, ‘Remedies to exclusionary innovation in the high-tech sector: is 
there a lesson from the Microsoft saga?’ (2007) 30(4) W. Comp. 623; also Larouche, ‘The European Microsoft 
case at the crossroads of competition policy and innovation’, TILEC Discussion Paper, May 2008, available 
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1140165#. For the ECHR approach, see e.g. appl. 
No 73049/01, Anheuser-Busch v Portugal, judgment of 11 January 2007, [2007] 45 EHRR 36; also appl. No 
35841/02, ORF v Austria, judgment of 7 December 2006. 
178 Appl. No 35014/97, judgment of 19 June 2006, [2007] 45 EHRR 4, para 195, 223-224. 
179 Appl. No 12633/87, decision of the European Commission on Human Rights, 4 October 1990. 
180 Id., part IV. 
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process’, i.e. a product which does not constitute an ‘obvious’ offshoot of existing 
technology would be developed and supplied and upon payment of royalties 
proportionate to the value of the invention.181 
This approach may be contrasted with the position adopted in EU competition law. 
Section 2 argued that the Commission and the European Courts have moved away 
from a rather cautious interpretation of Article 102 TFEU in respect to refusals to 
licence IP rights on the part of dominant firms to a far more generous view of how this 
provision should be applied to individual cases. It was suggested that, perhaps under 
the ‘influence’ of the 2007 Microsoft CFI judgment, the Commission 2009 Guidance has 
departed from the hitherto narrow reading of the conditions of ‘new product’ and of 
‘indispensability’ of the input protected by IPRs and to have embraced a more 
‘generous’ interpretation of the concepts of ‘objective necessity’ and of ‘likely consumer 
harm’. However, this move was criticised as focusing too heavily on the protection of 
competitors rather than on fostering ‘long term’ innovation and competition ‘on the 
merits’.182 
It is therefore questionable whether the approach adopted in the 2009 Guidance can be 
reconciled with the ECHR standards.183 It could be argued that the Guidance, by 
placing significant emphasis on encouraging follow-on innovation, does not seem to 
‘capture’ the actual impact of a forced licence on the long term incentive to innovate of 
individual firms and, therefore, could create a danger of allowing ‘copy-cat’ 
development at the expense of ‘genuine’ technical development, thus remaining at 
variance with the concept of ‘proportionality’ resulting from the ECHR.184  
It is suggested that without going as far as to embrace the rather ‘pro-enterprise’ 
approach championed by the US Supreme Court in its Trinko decision,185 the 
Commission could have framed its standard for the assessment of the ‘necessity’ and 
‘proportionality’ of antitrust remedies in such a way as to reflect the importance of 
encouraging innovation, even when denying a licence may appear capable of putting 
rivals at a disadvantage because the latter may no longer be able to offer similar or only 
upgraded products.186  
                                                                                                                                         
181 Ibid. 
182 See 2009 Guidance, paras 83-84, 87-88; cf. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH v OHG & NDC Health GmbH, 
[2001] ECR I-5039, para 48. For commentary, see, inter alia, Larouche, ‘The European Microsoft case at the 
crossroads of competition policy and innovation’, TILEC Discussion Paper, May 2008, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1140165#.  
183 Appl. No 12633/87, Smith Kline v the Netherlands, decision of 4 October 1990 (European Commission of 
Human Rights), part IV. 
184 2009 Guidance, para 87. 
185 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398, 124 S Ct 872, pp 409-410. For 
commentary, see, inter alia, Carrier, ‘Refusals to license intellectual property after Trinko’ (2006) 55 DePaul L 
Rev 1191 at 1208-1209; also Spulber & Yoo, ‘Mandating access to telecom and the internet: the hidden side of 
Trinko’ (2007) 107 Colum L Rev 1822 at 1873-1874, pp 1882-1884. 
186 See e.g. Andreangeli, ‘Interoperability as an essential facilities in the Microsoft case: encouraging competition or 
stifling innovation?’ (2009) 34(4) ELRev 584 at 610. 
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It is added that the notion of ‘likely consumer harm’ and of ‘necessity’ of the input, 
resulting from the 2009 Guidance, could be criticised as lacking clarity.187 In respect to 
the former, it could be argued that by referring generally to products ‘contributing to 
technical development’ the Commission has not resolved the evidentiary difficulties 
already characterising the assessment of the ‘new product’ requirement.188 It is 
therefore submitted that the 2009 Guidance may have been another ‘lost opportunity’ 
for the Commission to increase the clarity and foreseeability of the interpretation of 
Article 102 TFEU, as would have been required, inter alia, by the ECHR.189 
Similar concerns may be raised in relation to the conditions governing licenses in 
individual cases. Although it is clear that royalties should be payable to the licensor, 
there does not seem to be any ‘hard and fast’ rule governing the determination of their 
amount, which is left to the discretion of the European Commission. This position can 
be contrasted with the ECHR case law on controls on the use of property according to 
which providing ‘adequate compensation’ constitutes a key aspect of the 
proportionality assessment190 and should be ensured in accordance with reasonably 
foreseeable, clear and precise rules.191 
Against this background, it could be argued that the absence of clear guidelines as to 
the determination of royalties in return for a compulsory licence is not entirely 
consistent with the standards dictated by the ECHR and could raise issues as to 
whether the position of the licensor is adequately protected against the non-arbitrary 
restrictions of her exclusive IP rights. 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights also indicates that the overall 
‘fairness’ of the proceedings leading to the adoption of measures interfering with 
property rights and the existence of appropriate remedies to protect the position of the 
affected parties ensure the proportionality of the interference with their property 
rights.192 In respect to the former, a number of questions have been raised as to the 
extent to which the features of the antitrust proceedings before the Commission are 
compatible with the notion of ‘fair procedure’ enshrined in the ECHR.193 It is now 
                                                                                                                                         
187 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Robinson, ‘On refusing to deal with rivals’ (2002) 87 Cornell L Rev 1177 at 1996-
1997; also, inter alia, Katsoulacos, ‘Optimal legal standards for refusals to license intellectual property: a 
welfare-based analysis’ (2009) 5 J Comp L & E 269 at 287-288. 
188 See case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH v OHG & NDC Health GmbH, [2001] ECR I-5039, para 48; cf. 2007 
Microsoft judgment, para 647; for commentary, inter alia, Hatzopoulos, ‘Refusal to deal: the EC Essential 
facilities doctrine’, in Amato & Ehlermann (Eds), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment, 2007: Oxford, 
Portland/Oregon, Hart Publishing, p 354. 
189 See e.g. appl. No 8795/79, James v United Kingdom, [1986] 8 EHRR 123, para 67; see also, mutatis mutandis, appl. 
No 8691/79, Malone v United Kingdom, [1985] 7 EHRR 14, para 67-68. 
190 See e.g. appl. No 17849/91, Pressos Compania Naviera v Belgium, [1996] 21 EHRR 301, para 38; also appl. No 
19247/03, Balan v Moldova, judgment of 29 January 2008, paras 38-39. 
191 See e.g. appl. No 8795/79, James v United Kingdom, [1986] 8 EHRR 123, para 67; see also, mutatis mutandis, appl. 
No 8691/79, Malone v United Kingdom, [1985] 7 EHRR 14, paras 67-68. 
192 See e.g. appl. 13616/88, Hentrich v France, [1994] 18 EHRR, paras 45-46, 49. 
193 See e.g. Andreangeli, op cit, n 32, pp 224 ff. 
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accepted that due to the general applicability of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty and 
to the deterrent and punitive nature of the fines that can be imposed, competition cases 
at EU level are of a ‘criminal’ nature.194 Consequently, it was doubted that the 
concentration of the functions of ‘police, prosecutor and judge’ in the hands of the 
Commission alone, albeit under the (limited) judicial supervision exercised by the CFI 
and the ECJ, would be compatible with the Convention.195 
In Jussila v Finland the Strasbourg court seemed to accept that these safeguards would 
not apply to competition cases with the same intensity as to ‘fully criminal’ court cases 
concerning charges raised against an individual. However, it is submitted that there are 
a number of ‘problem areas’ in the rules governing Commission’s antitrust action, such 
as those related to admissibility of evidence, the right against self-incrimination and the 
protection of lawyer-client confidentiality and in the context of the decentralised 
enforcement of the Treaty competition rules, the observance of the principle of ne bis in 
idem.196  
Having regard more closely to the ex post monitoring of antitrust remedies, the 2007 
Microsoft judgment demonstrated the difficulties inherent to it and tested the limits of 
the powers conferred to the Commission.197 It could be argued that the annulment of 
the part of the 2004 decision creating and disciplining the operation of the ‘monitoring 
trustee’198 is especially telling of the need to provide more precise boundaries to the 
scope of the discretion enjoyed by the Commission in framing antitrust remedies in 
respect to decisions imposing an obligation to deal and to license under Article 102 
TFEU.199  
It is therefore suggested that the current approach adopted by the Commission appears 
to fall short of the requirements dictated by the ECHR in a number of respects. Firstly, 
the analysis of the conditions governing the application of Article 102 TFEU to refusals 
to licence in the light of the case law of the Strasbourg court concerning Article 1, 
Protocol I to the ECHR has demonstrated that the approach emerging from the 
Commission’s 2009 Guidance does not take into sufficient account the need to protect 
                                                                                                                                         
194 See e.g. Case T-77/00, JFE and others v Commission, [2004] ECR II-250, paras 173, 177-178. For commentary, 
inter alia, Wils, ‘The combination of the investigative and the prosecutorial function and the adjudicative 
function in EC antitrust enforcement: a legal and economic analysis’ (2004) 27(2) W. Comp. 201 at 210. 
195 Inter alia, Case T-156/94, Aristrain v Commission, [1999] ECR II-645, paras 87-90. See inter alia Andreangeli, op 
cit, n 32, pp 226-227. 
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pp 96 ff. 
197 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601, paras 1265, 1269-1270. 
198 See e.g. Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, Microsoft, OJ 2004, C900/1, para 1043. 
199 See 2007 Microsoft judgment, para 1268; for commentary, see, inter alia, case comment to Case T-201/04, 
Microsoft v Commission, (2008) 45(3) CMLRev 863 at p 868. 
Between Economic Freedom and Effective Competition Enforcement 
  (2010) 6(2) CompLRev 
 
252 
the drive to invest of the holder of the IPRs and to favour the pursuit of genuine 
innovation.200  
Secondly, given the importance of freedom of contract201 the imposition of such a wide 
ranging remedy as the forced grant of an IP licence without clear and precise criteria 
defining the amount of the royalties payable to the licensor or predetermined 
supervisory proceedings may not be entirely consistent with the requirements laid down 
by the ECHR for the protection of property rights.202 And thirdly, the indeterminacy of 
the criteria governing this type of remedy, such as the ‘new product’ requirement, and 
the lack of precise guidelines as to the way in which these decisions should be enforced 
and monitored contribute to expanding the hiatus between the existing EU antitrust 
law standards and the European Convention rules. 
Consequently, the question appears to be what the ‘way forward’ is to resolve these 
concerns. The next sections will examine the question of whether adopting more 
stringent standards governing refusals to licence could go some way toward addressing 
the perceived lack of consistency and of inherent ‘fairness’ and proportionality of this 
type of remedy, with a view to ensuring its compliance with the requirements of the 
‘rule of law’.  
4.2. Looking for a ‘fair balance’: is ‘going backwards’ the solution for EU 
antitrust remedies? 
Section 4.1 illustrated a number of issues arising from the analysis of antitrust remedies 
imposed in refusal to license cases in light of the principles enshrined in the ECHR and 
argued that the test arising from the 2009 Guidance may not ensure the imposition of 
‘proportionate’ obligations on the undertaking found to be responsible for an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU.203 Consequently, it could be wondered whether a 
‘return’ to the stricter conditions governing refusals to deal dictated by earlier case law 
could go some way to ensure that the antitrust remedies comply with the principles of 
‘fairness’ and ‘proportionality’ of Article 1, Protocol I.  
Having regard to what constitutes an ‘essential input’, it could be argued that a firm 
requesting a license should demonstrate the absence of an ‘alternative’ to the good 
protected by patent or copyright, or at the very least, should prove that duplicating the 
existing one would be impossible or excessively difficult, as affirmed by the ECJ in 
Bronner.204 A similar condition would be more consistent with the principle laid down in 
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Smith Kline according to which a compulsory licence would constitute a ‘proportionate’ 
control on the use of intellectual property only if the patent was indispensable to allow 
the working of an existing or later patent for the purpose of continuing technical 
development in a specific industry.  
In respect to the ‘new product’ condition, it is submitted that the IMS Health 
preliminary ruling and especially the opinion of AG Tizzano had captured in many 
ways the essence of the balancing exercise that must be conducted to reconcile the 
interests of IPRs owners and the goals of public interest demanding a compulsory 
license.205 It is argued that by requiring the firm seeking the licence to prove that, 
thanks to the access to the protected input, a ‘novel’ product would be supplied the 
ECJ had balanced the needs of innovation with the legitimate interests of the copyright 
holder in a manner consistent with the requirements of the ECHR.206 Consequently, 
compulsory licences would be restricted to cases in which as a result of the transfer of 
technology a product would be developed which is not an ‘obvious’ offshoot of 
existing inventions and would therefore meet consumer needs hitherto not satisfied by 
current supplies.  
It is acknowledged that such a strict view of what is a ‘new product’ would probably 
not allow the forced disclosure of protected inputs to support ‘follow on’ innovation. 
However, it is argued that a less interventionist approach to the application of Article 
102 TFEU to these cases would be preferable to the position adopted in the 2009 
Guidance, since it would reduce the risk of ‘upsetting’ the incentive to invest in further 
technical development on the part of the owner of key technologies by limiting the 
reach of the resulting remedies only to cases in which consumers would be clearly likely 
to benefit from the offer of ‘genuinely novel’ products.207 
The rather liberal approach adopted by the 2009 Guidance in relation to refusals to 
license could also be criticised for its lack of clarity. It is recalled from section 4.1 that 
to comply with the Convention requirements, the rules governing any interference with 
property rights should be ‘prescribed by law’, i.e. sufficiently clear and precise as to 
allow the individual or legal person affected by these measures to foresee the 
consequences of the exercise of public powers on their legal position.208  
Section 3.1 illustrated that the compliance with criteria of legal certainty and 
predictability is of capital importance in competition policy. It was argued that since 
competition law provides the ‘rules of the game’ in the market, it capable of channelling 
the behaviour of all economic actors in ‘welfare enhancing directions’ and, in so doing, 
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ensures that the powers of the public authorities entrusted with ‘creating the 
scaffolding’ for the functioning of the economy are confined within well defined 
boundaries.209 
Against this background, it could be argued that the generous view adopted by the 
Commission in respect to refusals to deal has not only ‘diluted’ the meaning of the 
original criteria determining a finding of abuse to the point that they can no longer 
‘strike a balance’ between the goal of genuine competition and the need to foster 
innovation.210 They have also become so ‘opaque’ that they do not appear capable of 
assisting dominant companies in assessing the future antitrust consequences of their 
decision to deny access to their inventions.  
The concept of ‘likely consumer harm’, seen in light of the old ‘new product’ 
requirement, illustrates how legal certainty could be jeopardised. Whereas the 2009 
Guidance refers generally to the likelihood that a forced license could lead to future 
technical development (including ‘follow on’ innovation) and considers this concept as 
almost equivalent to the requirement that access to IP rights result in the supply of 
‘brand new’ products,211 the ‘new product’ limited forced licenses only to cases in 
which they enabled the licensee to supply a genuinely novel product or service.212  
Against this background, it is argued that if it was already difficult to assess whether the 
‘new product’ condition had been fulfilled, due to the complexity of this inherently 
technical appraisal, it would be even more complicated to predict the directions of the 
technical development of a specific industry as well as the possible impact that a 
compulsory licence could have on it.213 Consequently, it is suggested that recourse to 
conditions that are more similar to the ‘old’ IMS Health test would go some way toward 
ensuring not only that the criterion in question fulfils its ‘critical function’ in the 
appraisal of refusals to licence but also complies with requirements of clarity, 
foreseeability and legal certainty and ultimately with the rule of law.214 
In the light of the 2009 Guidance and of the Microsoft case, it can be doubted that the 
Commission and the General Court, at least, will adopt an approach similar to the 
earlier legal standards. The next section will explore whether the US practice as regards 
the restrictions of property rights and of freedom of covenant, both generally and 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, can offer further insights and a blueprint for a 
sufficiently clear, reasonable and non-arbitrary set of conditions. 
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4.3. Refusal to licence as an ‘exceptional’ case of monopolisation: insights from 
the application of the Due Process clause and of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Section 3.4 illustrated the approach adopted by the US Supreme Court in relation to 
restrictions of property rights and of freedom of covenant in commercial activities. It 
was argued that the initial ‘laissez-faire’ attitude shown by the Court in Lochner, 
according to which the Due Process clause enshrined in the 5th and 14th Amendments 
should be read as providing a ‘presumption in favour of liberty’ that can only be 
rebutted in exceptional cases, was gradually replaced by a more interventionist stance, 
according to which the Courts would not question the validity of measures affecting 
property rights or freedom of covenant unless the former had been restricted in an 
arbitrary or disproportionate manner.215 
Thereafter, section 3.5 illustrated that the American judicature is extremely cautious in 
imposing on commercial entities, even powerful ones, any obligation to deal with their 
rivals.216 It was illustrated that a finding of monopolisation in cases of refusals to 
licence IP rights would only occur if the IPRs owner was acting ‘beyond the scope of 
the patent’,217 i.e. if its refusal to grant a licence was clearly aimed at excluding rivals 
from the relevant market.218  
Against this background, it may be questioned whether the application of a standard 
inspired by the approach to refusals to licence established by the US superior courts 
could be a viable alternative to the position adopted in the 2009 Guidance. It is 
suggested that by relying on the concept of ‘abuse of patent’ as a means to define what 
constitutes ‘monopolisation’ and by requiring proof of ‘anti-competitive malice’, the US 
Courts may be in danger of overlooking cases in which a forced licence may actually 
have led to ‘genuine’ technical advancement.219  
Commentators suggested that the Supreme Court in Trinko may have assumed perhaps 
too readily that legitimately acquired economic power almost inevitably led to further 
innovation and that this innovation could have been ‘translated’ in consumer welfare.220 
According to Stucke, ‘Trinko ignores the costs of monopolies to future innovation’ and, 
with its emphasis on the importance of ‘monopoly rents’ as a means to encourage 
investment in R&D, creates the risk of increasing costs for other firms wishing to bring 
that innovation forward.221 
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Although they accepted that monitoring the observance of antitrust remedies targeting 
unilateral behaviour raises significant difficulties for the Courts,222 other authors were 
left partially unconvinced by the arguments in favour of the narrow application of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act to refusals to licence.223 Thus, it may be argued that the 
approach developed by the US superior courts in respect to the application of section 2 
of the Sherman Act to unilateral refusals to licence IP rights, whilst being motivated by 
justifiable concerns for the continuing drive to innovation of ‘powerful’ firms as well as 
for the difficulties arising from the ex post oversight of the remedies imposed for an 
infringement, may be too restrictive to strike a ‘fair balance’ between the needs of ‘free 
enterprise’ and the objective of undistorted competition and ultimately of technical 
development. 
Accordingly, it is concluded that the US style view of this type of practices does not 
constitute an entirely suitable alternative to the 2009 Guidance on the application of 
Article 102 TFEU to like cases. What, instead, the earlier sections seem to suggest is 
that an alternative benchmark which is both ‘proportionate’, as required by the ECHR, 
and ‘workable’, i.e. consistent with the requirements of ‘quality of the law’ dictated by 
the Convention and enshrined in the principles of the rule of law could be found in 
existing principles of EU competition law. 
5. A ‘PROPORTIONATE’ REMEDY TO ABUSIVE REFUSALS TO LICENCE: 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
The previous sections analysed the conditions governing antitrust remedies according 
to Article 7 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 and illustrated how the Commission can 
considerably restrict the right of the parties concerned to enjoy their possessions and to 
choose whether and with whom to conclude contracts, protected by human rights 
instruments such as the ECHR. It was argued that since its ‘appropriateness’ to the 
infringement constitutes a key consideration as to its legality, the assessment of the 
compliance of a given remedy with the principles enshrined in the Convention cannot 
be separated from a consideration of the substantive rules governing that individual 
breaches.  
A number of concerns have emerged on the extent to which especially the generous 
approach adopted by the Commission in its 2009 Guidance could actually ensure that a 
fair balance is struck between the legitimate interest of the parties concerned and the 
goal of genuine competition. It was argued that the Commission’s Guidance may have 
‘watered down’ the criteria governing the finding of abusive behaviour in refusal to 
licence cases to the point that they would not only be incapable of balancing these two 
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competing objectives, but would also be inconsistent, at least in part, with canons of 
clarity, legal certainty and predictability on which adherence to the rule of law rests. 
As a result, questions have been raised as to whether alternative approaches could be 
developed to address these concerns. Could a set of conditions for antitrust remedies 
applicable to refusals to licence be developed in the light of the relevant principles 
developed in the context of the ECHR outright? Or would this ‘transplantation’ cause 
more problems than it actually resolves? Section 4.2 illustrated how a ‘return’ to the 
original IMS Health approach would go some way toward ensuring compliance with the 
Convention standards: especially the notions of ‘indispensability’ and of ‘new product’ 
appear rather close to the Smith Kline requirement of proportionality and could 
therefore constitute an ideal ‘starting point’ in the development of a new set of 
conditions for this type of remedy.  
It was suggested that the Court of Justice’s view of the notions of ‘indispensability’ and 
of ‘new product’ would allow that ‘balancing exercise’ between the needs of innovation 
and the realisation of genuinely competitive market conditions predicated in Smith Kline 
and could therefore provide a useful frame of reference for antitrust remedies. It was 
added that a ‘return’ to the IMS Health set of conditions would ensure compliance with 
the requirements of clarity, foreseeability and legal certainty enshrined in the rule of 
law. Although the test is likely to prompt potentially complex questions of fact, it 
would be capable of providing a sufficiently reliable framework for the assessment of 
‘suspicious’ refusals to license, which is so important if antitrust standards are to be 
applied to ‘channel’ economic behaviour in ‘welfare enhancing directions’.224 
It is added that discussing the compliance of antitrust remedies with the standards 
governing property rights and freedom of contract has led us to question once again 
whether the rules applicable to unilateral exclusionary conduct, and especially to 
refusals to license, under Article 102 TFEU, can reconcile the apparently diverging 
goals of competition and technical innovation.  
This paper has argued that the 2009 Guidance adopted a position which appears partly 
incapable of reconciling the apparently conflicting goals of competition and technical 
innovation as well as unlikely to give any clear guidance to the antitrust authorities and 
the concerned parties alike as to whether denying an IP licence in a given case would 
actually be compatible with Article 102 TFEU. Therefore it is hoped that just as any 
‘good wine connoisseur’ the Commission and the ECJ will come to appreciate once 
again the ‘quality’ of the ‘vintage’ IMS Health requirements and therefore to frame the 
rules applicable to the antitrust remedies in this area in a way which respects the 
dictates of the rule of law without discouraging dominant companies from engaging in 
technical development. 
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